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In this paper we address the problem of distributed sources of information, or agents,
that observe the environment locally and have to communicate in order to reﬁne their
hypothesis regarding the actual state of this environment. One way to address the problem
would be to centralize all the collected observations and knowledge, and to centrally
compute the resulting theory. In many situations however, it would not be possible to
adopt this centralized approach (e.g. for practical reasons, or privacy concerns). In this
paper, we assume that agents individually face abductive or inductive tasks in a globally
coherent environment, and we show that general mechanisms can be designed that
abstractly regard both cases as special instances of a problem of hypothesis reﬁnement
through propagation. Assuming that agents are equipped with some individual revision
machinery, our concern will be to investigate how (under what conditions) convergence
to a consistent state can be guaranteed at more global levels: (i) between two agents;
(ii) in a clique of agents; and (iii) in general in a connected society of agents.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper we address the problem of distributed sources of information (agents) that observe the environment locally,
and have to communicate in order to reﬁne their hypothesis regarding the actual state of this environment. One way to
address the problem would be to centralize all the collected observations and data, and to centrally compute the resulting
theory. This trivially solves the problem if we assume that the situation is globally consistent, but still requires merging
knowledge bases if agents have potentially conﬂicting opinions [9]. In many situations however, it would not be possible
to adopt this centralized approach; either because no agent would be prepared to play the role of a central authority;
because the number and spatial partition of agents renders that approach unrealistic in practice; or because privacy concerns
prevent agents to communicate some of their information. This would be the case for instance if different labs could hold
observations (medical data) regarding a patient, and had to carefully communicate with each other in order to come up
with a satisfying diagnosis, while keeping some information private. One further illustration would be agents representing
different knowledge bases storing examples linking genes and function, and agents communicating in order to reﬁne their
knowledge of the gene-function rule.
In the context of this paper, we assume that the environment is globally consistent. As the examples above suggest,
the task that agents face can be either abductive or inductive, and we argue in this paper that general mechanisms can
be designed that abstractly regard both cases as special instances of a problem of hypothesis reﬁnement through propagation.
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be equipped with some individual revision machinery, and our concern will be to investigate how (under what conditions)
consistency at a more global level (being it two agents, or within the whole system) can be guaranteed. As it is clear
from our introduction, we will not adopt here a broadcast method that would widely propagate agents’ knowledge, but
favour more focused mechanisms that seek to optimize information propagation. Section 3 presents these protocols, and
discusses their properties. The paper then shows how the framework can be instantiated in the context of an abductive or
inductive application (Section 4). Section 5 makes some comparisons with related work. Section 6 concludes and reports on
preliminary experiments that have been published in companion papers.
2. Formal model
In this section, we introduce a generic framework encompassing both abductive and inductive distributed hypothesis
formation as instances of a hypothesis reﬁnement problem. We characterize this problem with some abstract notions that
serve as a common basis to develop revision mechanisms, and must be instantiated according to the chosen type of hypoth-
esis formation and knowledge representation. First we shall describe the knowledge of an agent. We will then introduce
different notions of consistency, as well as corresponding revision mechanisms. Finally, constraints on communications will
be detailed.
2.1. Agent
We consider a system populated by n agents a1, . . . ,an . Each agent ai has two different kinds of knowledge:
• Ki is the information set, representing all the certain, non-revisable, knowledge of the agent. Among this certain knowl-
edge, we further distinguish two sets:
◦ F , the set of facts, is the common ground of the agents. It represents prior knowledge that is shared by all agents.
◦ O i is its observation set. We assume perfect sensors and memory, hence these observations are certain and the set
grows monotonically. This set represents the collected knowledge of each individual agent, it contains all certain knowl-
edge that is acquired by the agents. We denote by O the set of possible observations in the system, therefore, O i ⊆ O.
• Ai is the belief base, or assumed hypotheses set, representing all the uncertain, explicit knowledge of the agent. These
beliefs are usually derived from non-monotonic inferences and are therefore revisable. We can constrain this set by
specifying the set H of possible hypotheses. We will denote by hi the conjunction or disjunction (according to the
application) of all the elements of Ai , called the working hypothesis, or favourite hypothesis of the agent.
These different types of knowledge can have different kinds of representation according to the problem. Some examples
will be given in Section 4. Using this explicit knowledge, we can now derive the implicit knowledge of the agent. The belief
set Bi , representing all the knowledge the agent believes to be true, with or without certainty, is deﬁned as Bi = Cn(Ki ∪ Ai)
(where, at this point, Cn(T ) represents the set of all possible conclusions that can be soundly derived from T ). Among this
belief set Bi , we will distinguish the closed information set Ki = Cn(Ki) representing all the certain knowledge, that the agent
knows to be true. A very important assumption of our work is that we rely on some existing certain knowledge which must
be consistent as it is not revisable. To ensure this, we assume the following:
Assumption 1 (Consistent world assumption). There exists a consistent theory T 0 such that all certain knowledge in the
system belongs to that theory. Speciﬁcally, the prior knowledge belongs to it (F ⊂ T 0) as well as any observation made by
any agent in the system (∀i, O i ⊂ T 0).
2.2. Consistency
As beliefs are uncertain, there can be contradiction between them. We want to ensure that the working hypothesis hi
(and by extension the belief set Bi) has some property ensuring its internal coherence and adequacy with the information
set Ki . We shall then deﬁne an abstract notion of consistency relation to capture this adequacy. Depending on the type of
beliefs or hypotheses, this relation might take different forms such as logical coherence, when considering belief revision,
or coherence and completeness of an abductive or inductive hypothesis, when building explanation or generating rules. This
notion is used to abstract away from the speciﬁcs of different applications and deﬁne communication protocols as generic as
possible. We will represent it as a complete binary relation Consα(h, K ) between an hypothesis h  H1 and an information
set K , where α will enable different instantiations for applications. As F is common to all agents and does not vary, we will
take it out of the consistency notation, and abuse the notation slightly by simply denoting the basic consistency relation by
Consα(h, O ).
1 We will denote by h  H the fact that h is a conjunction or disjunction of elements of H.
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behind it will be detailed later on, we will now expose a simple informal example of induction (using Consind) as a mean
to illustrate some principles.
Example 1. We consider the following toy problem. We have a set of colored cards with two different white symbols, one
on each face, both faces of the colored card being of the same color. Some player divides these cards in two heaps according
to some secret criterion that is not revealed to other players. For example, he could decide to keep in the ﬁrst heap only
black cards with a triangle and yellow cards with a bow. The problem is then for the other players to guess what criterion
is used, by randomly drawing cards from one of the two heaps (the choice of which heap to draw the card from is random,
but the player is informed afterwards). Possible ﬁgures are {(t)riangle, (c)ircle, (s)quare, (r)ectangle, (h)exagon, (b)ow} and
possible colors are {bl(a)ck,yell(o)w, r(e)d}. A card will be represented by 3 letters and a symbol “+” if it comes from the
ﬁrst heap ( “−” otherwise). “bat+” will thus correspond to a black card with a bow and triangle, that has been drawn from
the ﬁrst heap, whereas “sec−” would be a red card with a square and a circle, drawn from the second heap. An observation,
called example, would then be a drawn card (with indication of the heap it was drawn from).
A criterion can be expressed as a boolean DNF formulae on the different possible characteristics of a card (t, c, s, r,h,b,
a,o, e). Deciding to keep in the ﬁrst heap only black cards with a triangle and yellow cards with a bow would then corre-
spond to the criterion (a ∧ t) ∨ (o ∧ c), that will be shortened as at ∨ oc. Hypotheses would then be DNF formulae on these
atoms, with the aim to guess the criterion.
An hypothesis will be consistent with an observation set (a set of drawn cards) if someone using it as a criterion would
classify the drawn cards in the same way that they were originally classiﬁed. The hypothesis, considered as a criterion,
should be veriﬁed by all cards that were drawn from the ﬁrst heap (completeness), and should not be veriﬁed by any card
drawn from the second heap (coherence).
Thus, given the following set of drawn cards E1 = {bat+, cat+, set−}, and the hypotheses h1 = at, h2 = bat∨ cat, h3 = bat
and h4 = t we will have:
• h1 and h2 are consistent with E1 because they are veriﬁed by bat and cat which are drawn from the ﬁrst heap (+), and
not by set which is drawn from the second heap.
• h3 is not consistent with E1, because it is not veriﬁed by cat. Thus it classiﬁes cat+ in the second pile instead of the
ﬁrst pile (incompleteness).
• h4 is not consistent with E1, because it is veriﬁed by sec. Thus it classiﬁes sec in the ﬁrst heap instead of the second
one (incoherence).
The only requirement that we put on the consistency relation is the following:
Assumption 2 (Compositionality of the consistency relation). The consistency relation Consα(h, O ) is compositional, meaning
that:
Consα(h, O ) and Consα(h, O
′) ⇔ Consα(h, O ∪ O ′)
To understand the consequences of this assumption, it is useful to distinguish both directions of this equivalence relation.
The ‘⇒’ direction is often called additivity [5]. It basically means that it is possible to consider each observation indepen-
dently. The ‘⇐’ direction is best understood when we read the contrapositive: it says that inconsistency is monotonic (that
is, when h is not consistent with some observation set O , it cannot become consistent again when that set grows mono-
tonically). In other words, an hypothesis assessed inconsistent on the basis of an observation set cannot become consistent
when that set grows. We refer to this latter property, following Flach [5], as incrementality. Depending on the application
domain, both assumptions may be challenged and relaxed. We now make our abstract notion of consistency more precise.
The basic notion that we shall use is the notion of group consistency.
Deﬁnition 1 (Group Consistency). An agent ai is group consistent w.r.t. the group of agents G (GCons(ai,G)) iff
Cons(hi,
⋃
i∈G O i).
Note that the deﬁnition does not necessarily imply that ai belongs to G . However, we did not encounter interesting
cases where it would be required to consider this case. We shall then assume that ai ∈ G in the remainder of this paper.
A stronger notion of consistency requires any agent within the group to be consistent with the entire group.
Deﬁnition 2 (Mutual Consistency). A group of agents is mutually consistent (MCons(G)) iff ∀ai ∈ G , it is the case that
GCons(ai,G).
Now for the purpose of our work, we shall mainly be interested in some interesting particular cases which depends on
the cardinality of the group G:
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• Internal consistency—this is the limit case when G is limited to a single agent. In this case, Group and Mutual consistency
collapse into a single notion that we shall call internal consistency (ICons(ai)).
• Peer-consistency—when the group of agents we consider contains only two agents. In this case we can distinguish both
the peer consistency of an agent w.r.t. a fellow agent, and the mutual peer-consistency of a group of two agents (see
Fig. 1). This is especially important in our context, since our communication protocols only deal locally with bilateral
communications.
• MAS-consistency—we conclude with the limit case involving all agents within the society. In this case, we will refer to
the MAS-consistency of an agent w.r.t. to the society; and to the mutual MAS-consistency of a society of agents.
For the sake of readability, we now introduce some notational sugar. When we refer to the internal consistency of an
agent ai , we shall simply write ICons(ai). As for the case of peer and MAS consistency, we will put the cardinality of
the group involved as an exponent (recall that the society is composed of n agents). The different notations obtained are
summarized in the following table.
Level of Consistency Group Consistency Mutual Consistency
Internal (single agent) ICons(ai) ICons(ai)
Peer (pair of agents) GCons2α(ai , {ai ,a j}) MCons2α({ai ,a j})
MAS (society of agents) GConsnα(ai , {a1, . . . ,an}) MConsnα({a1, . . . ,an})
Example 2. We illustrate these notions with a small system of three agents and the cards problem described earlier. Agent
a1 has drawn three cards E1 = {bat+, cat+, set−}2 and has hypothesis h1 = at.
Agent a2 has drawn ﬁve cards E2 = {toc+, rat+, sat+, sec−} and has hypothesis h2 = at ∨ boc.
Agent a3 has drawn two cards E3 = {hat+, toc+,bac−} and has hypothesis h3 = t .
This means that: (i) h1 is consistent with E1 and but neither with E2 nor E3; (ii) h2 is consistent with E1, E2 and E3;
(iii) h3 is consistent with E3 and E2, but not with E1. In other words, the following levels of consistency are achieved: (i) all
agents are internally consistent; (ii) a3 is peer-consistent with a2 and but not with a1; (iii) as a2 is also peer-consistent
with a3, it is the case that a2 and a3 are mutually peer-consistent; (iv) a2 is peer-consistent with a1, and a3, thus a2 is
mas-consistent; however, (v) a1 and a2 are not mutually peer-consistent and the system is not mutually mas-consistent.
2.3. Revision mechanisms
To ensure its consistency, each agent is equipped with an abstract reasoning machinery that we shall call the hypothesis
formation function Eh . This function takes a set of observations and an hypothesis as input, and returns a single preferred
hypothesis. We assume h′ = Eh(h, O ) to be consistent with O by deﬁnition of Eh , so using this function on its observation
set to determine its favourite hypothesis is a sure way for the agent to achieve internal consistency. If the hypothesis h′
returned by the hypothesis formation function does depend on the former hypothesis h, Eh will be said to be incremental
(that is, ∃h1,h2, O ,Eh(h1, O ) = Eh(h2, O )). Otherwise it will be said to be non-incremental. A non-incremental hypothesis
formation function only depends on the observation set, and can therefore be written as Eh(O ).
An internal revisionmechanism is a mechanism μ by which an agent ai (with its working hypothesis hi and its observation
set O i) receiving an observation o updates its observation set by adding up o, and update its working hypothesis to h′i =
μ(hi, O i,o).
2 Ei refers to an example memory, which is the name of an observation set in the inductive learning setting.
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internally consistent agent ai and any observation o reaching ai , the application of μ by ai preserves its internal consistency.
More formally:
∀o∀O i∀hi, Consα(hi, O i) ⇒ Consα
(
μ(hi, O i,o), O i ∪ {o}
)
A simple internal revision mechanism μEh consists of replacing hi by h
′
i = Eh(hi, O i ∪ {o}) upon receipt of a new obser-
vation o. It guarantees internal consistency. In what follows we assume that agents are equipped with a revision mechanism
that guarantees internal consistency.
When an agent ﬁnds an hypothesis that is MAS-consistent, it might seem interesting to share it directly with all other
agents, and ask them to adopt this hypothesis. Such a behaviour is ﬁne to construct a single common hypothesis, but there
are some cases in which it is better not to use adoption. If we want to obtain a group of hypotheses rather than a single
one (for instance in order to use a vote system, following principles of ensemble learning), adoption should be avoided.
Moreover, if our agent uses a non-incremental hypothesis formation function (or internal revision mechanism), adoption is
not very useful. Indeed, if an observation triggers an internal revision, the adopted hypothesis will be forgotten and have no
impact on the revision. We thus introduce the notion of individualism:
Deﬁnition 4 (Individualism). An agent is said to be individualistic iff its working hypothesis hi may only be modiﬁed as a
consequence of an internal revision mechanism μ guaranteeing internal consistency.
This means that no other agent can directly impose a given hypothesis on it. As a consequence, only a new observation
(a new perception, or an observation communicated by a fellow agent) can result in a modiﬁcation of its working hypoth-
esis hi . This ensures that an agent will always construct its hypothesis on the basis of its own observations, and will thus
be able to defend it or adapt it on this basis if needed. When the internal revision mechanism is incremental, adoption can
be worthwhile, as possible new hypotheses are build using the adopted hypothesis. Non-individualistic agents will thus be
equipped with an adoption process, allowing them to take a proposed hypothesis that is consistent with their observation
set as their own hypothesis. We will devise mechanisms for both individualistic and non-individualistic agents.
A local revision mechanism is a mechanism (denoted M2 following our notation convention) by which an agent ai receiv-
ing an observation o communicates with another agent a j to update its working hypothesis and possibly the hypothesis of
the other agent. A global revision mechanism is a mechanism Mn by which an agent ai receiving an observation o triggers a
series of local revision mechanisms to update its working hypothesis and possibly the hypotheses of the other agents.
Deﬁnition 5. A revision mechanism M guarantees GCons(ai,G) (resp. MCons(G)) iff, for any observation o reaching ai , it
is the case that the execution of M by ai with G will result in a situation where GCons(ai,G) (resp. MCons(G)) holds.
In particular, a local mechanism will be said to guarantee peer-consistency (resp. mutual peer-consistency), while a global
mechanism would guarantee MAS-consistency (resp. mutual MAS-consistency).
2.4. Communication
The communication of the agents might be constrained by topological consideration. A given agent will only be able to
communicate with a number of neighbours. Typically, an agent can only communicate with agents that it knows, but one
could imagine topological constraints on communication based on a network of communication links between agents. Who
an agent can communicate with will be ﬁxed beforehand, and remain static during the time required for the hypothesis
reﬁnement process. We can then construct a communication graph representing these communication links between the
agent. We assume that the relation that links two neighbours in a communication graph is symmetric,3 but of course not
transitive. A communication path will then refer to a path between two agents in the communication graph. In the following,
we will suppose that the communication graph is connected, that is, there exists a communication path between any pair of
agents.
3. Communication protocols
We are now in a position to examine different (local and global) communication protocols, and to investigate what
properties they guarantee, when used with some speciﬁc agents’ strategies.
3 Symmetry is assumed for the sake of simplicity. One could imagine asymmetric communication, where only one of the agent can initiate a discussion.
For instance, we could have hierarchical communication where an employee can only speak to his boss if asked to. In such a case, however, we would still
need messages to be exchanged in both directions (the agent initiating the discussion needs some answers), even if some asymmetric discrimination can
be done about the content of those messages.
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3.1. Local revision mechanisms
In this section, we present two different local revision mechanisms. Each of these consists in a communication protocol
with an associated strategy.
Unilateral Hypothesis Exchange. The ﬁrst mechanism M2U uses an asymmetric protocol that we call Unilateral Hypothe-
sis Exchange (UHE). The agent applying the mechanism takes an active role in building and reﬁning an hypothesis. It is
called the learner agent. The second agent is a critic, that uses its knowledge to acknowledge or invalidate the proposed
hypothesis.
Fig. 2 illustrates the protocol. The associated strategy is as follows. The learner agent ai ﬁrst updates its hypothesis hi to h′i
using an internal revision mechanism μ guaranteeing ICons(ai). Then it proposes it to the partner agent a j , called critic, and
a j either replies with acceptdirect and adopts h
′
i as its new working hypothesis if Consα(h
′
i, O j), or otherwise sends counter-
example(o′), where o′ ∈ O j is such that Consα(h′i, {o′}) is false. Upon reception of a counter-example, ai applies again μ to
update its hypothesis with the new observation, and proposes the resulting hypothesis as before, except that an acceptance
will now result in a acceptindirect message. (The reason justifying the distinction between acceptdirect and acceptindirect will
become clear later.)
Example 3. We consider two agents in our running cards problem. The example memory of the agents is as follows:
E1 = {cat+,bat+, set−,bot−} and E2 = {toc+,bec−}
Their hypotheses are h1 = at and h2 = toc. If agent a1 was to communicate with a2 using the Unilateral Hypothesis Exchange
Protocol, we would get the following dialogue.
a1 sends to a2 propose(at)
a2 sends to a1 counter-example(toc+)
a1 sends to a2 propose(at ∨ toc)
a2 sends to a1 accept
After this exchange, a2 would adopt the new hypothesis h′1 = at ∨ toc.
Thus h′2 = h′1 = at∨ toc. Moreover, E1 would have been changed to E ′1 = {cat+,bat+, set−,bot−, toc+}, while E2 remains
unchanged.
Property 1.When agents are non-individualistic M2U guarantees mutual peer-consistency.
Proof. Let n1= card(O j \ O i). Each time a j receives an hypothesis hi from ai , it will check the consistency of this hypothesis
against its observation set, by considering individually each observation it contains.
• If there is an observation o ∈ O j such that Consα(hi, {o}) is false, then o is sent as a counter-example to ai . Now
suppose that o ∈ O i , then Consα(hi, O i) would hold, and by virtue of the incrementality of consistency this would in
turn imply that Consα(hi, {o}), which is known to be false. Therefore o /∈ O i , that is o ∈ O j \ O i . When ai receives the
counter-example, it adds it to its observation set (O ′i = O i ∪ {o}). This means that n1 decreases (as o /∈ O j \ O ′i).• If there is no observation o ∈ O j such that Consα(hi, {o}) is false (the agent cannot ﬁnd any counter-example), then,
because the Cons relation is complete, it implies that each of its observation, when taken separately, is consistent with
hi . The additivity of the consistency in turn implies that Consα(hi, O j) (this hypothesis is consistent with the whole
observation set of agent a j). Agent a j sends an accept, which terminates the protocol.
At each hypothesis proposal either n1 decreases, or the protocol ends with an accept. As n1 is a positive integer, it cannot
decrease for ever. So this protocol will end with an accept after at most n1 hypothesis proposals. Upon termination, we
necessarily have Consα(hi, O j) and Consα(hi, O i) and the adoption of the proposed hypothesis ensures that h j = hi . That
is, agents ai and a j each have a common hypothesis that is consistent with O i and O j . Hence MCons(ai,a j) holds. This
demonstrates that this revision mechanism guarantees mutual peer-consistency. 
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peer consistency). However, the fact that the critic agent adopts the learner’s hypothesis clearly violates the property of
individualism.
Unilateral Hypothesis Exchangewithout Adoption. A straightforward possible variant of this mechanism (M2UwA) preserving
the individualism of the agents would require that a j does not adopt the hypothesis when it accepts it. This variant only
guarantees peer-consistency instead of mutual peer-consistency. The local consistency of a j with ai is indeed not ensured, that
is, we have GCons2α(ai, {ai,a j}), but not GCons2α(a j, {a j,ai}).
Bilateral Hypothesis Exchange. To get a local revision mechanism that guarantees mutual peer consistency but still pre-
serves the individualism of agents, we make the unilateral UHE mechanism symmetric. The obtained protocol is called the
Bilateral Hypotheses Exchange protocol. Here, the critic agent becomes learner agent once it has validated the other agent’s
hypothesis. This mechanism can be interpreted as two reciprocal applications of the unilateral protocol without adoption of
hypotheses. Note that when termination is reached, it is not guaranteed that agents will share the same hypothesis. Still,
we indeed have GCons2α(ai, {ai,a j}) and GCons2α(a j, {ai,a j}). This mechanism then guarantees mutual peer-consistency.
Example 4. We consider the same two agents as before in the cards problem. Their example memory is, again, as follows:
E1 = {cat+,bat+, set−,bot−} and E2 = {toc+,bec−}
Their hypotheses are h1 = at and h2 = toc. Now if these two agents were to communicate using the Bilateral Hypothesis
Exchange Protocol, we would get the following dialogue.
a1 sends to a2 propose(at)
a2 sends to a1 counter-example(toc+)
a1 sends to a2 propose(at ∨ toc)
a2 sends to a1 counter-propose(toc)
a1 sends to a2 counter-example(cat+)
a2 sends to a1 propose(tc)
a1 sends to a2 counter-example(bat+)
a2 sends to a1 propose(t)
a1 sends to a2 counter-example(set−)
a2 sends to a1 propose(tc∨ bat)
a1 sends to a2 accept
After this exchange, we will have:
h′1 = at ∨ oc, h′2 = tc∨ bat,
E ′1 = {cat+,bat+, set−,bot−, toc+}, and E ′2 = {toc+,bec−, cat+,bat+, set−}
Property 2. M2B guarantees MCons2α({ai,a j}).
Proof. The proof follows from Property 1. First, the application of M2UwA by ai with a j guarantees that hi is consistent with
O i ∪ O j . But as a j does not adopt hi , it only ensures GCons2α(ai, {ai,a j}). After that, the second application of M2UwA by
a j with ai ensures GCons2α(a j, {ai,a j}). GCons2α(ai, {ai,a j}) is still true, because this second application does not modify hi
nor O i ∪ O j (O j might be modiﬁed, but only by the addition of some observations from O i). Thus, these two properties
together ensure MCons2α({ai,a j}). 
In addition, unlike M2U , this mechanism respects the agents’ individualism. This enables us to get several different
consistent hypotheses, but makes it more diﬃcult to maintain the consistency at the global level. Let us now consider this
level in more detail.
3.2. Global revision mechanisms (for cliques)
We ﬁrst present our main mechanism for a fully connected society, and some of its variants.
Clock-like Hypothesis Propagation. The general idea is to make repeated use of a local mechanism guaranteeing mutual
peer-consistency to eventually get a MAS-consistent hypothesis adopted by all agents. The hypothesis must be validated by
all agents in turn without being changed. Any change in the hypothesis forces us to check it again from the beginning.
Intuitively, as consistency is additive, the hypothesis should get accurate enough to become consistent with all agents.
In more detail, the global revision mechanism Mn can be described as follows. When the learner agent a1 applies itC
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mutual consistency with agent a2. Then it does the same with agent a3. If the local protocol ends with an acceptdirect , then
a1 proceeds to exchange its hypothesis with the next agent (a4), else (acceptindirect) it goes back to a2. This iterates, each
acceptindirect restarting the process with a new hypothesis submitted to a2. When an sends a acceptdirect , it means that the
hypothesis has been accepted and adopted in turn by all agents. In such a case, the mechanism ends, and this common
hypothesis is MAS-consistent.
Example 5. We consider the cards toy problem, and a fully connected system of four agents a1,a2,a3,a4. The example
memories of the agents are the following: E1 = {hat+}, E2 = {boc+}, E3 = {rot−,bat+}, and E4 = ∅.
The previous deliberation has led the system to adopt the common hypothesis h = h1 = h2 = h3 = h4 = at ∨ boc.
Now, agent a4 receives a new example toc+, that is inconsistent with h. This triggers the global revision mechanism MC
as detailed below:
a4 sends to a1 propose(t ∨ boc)
a1 sends to a4 acceptdirect
a4 sends to a2 propose(t ∨ boc)
a2 sends to a4 acceptdirect
a4 sends to a3 propose(t ∨ boc)
a3 sends to a4 counter-example(rot−)
a4 sends to a3 propose(oc)
a3 sends to a4 counter-example(bat+)
a4 sends to a3 propose(oc∨ bat)
a3 sends to a4 acceptindirect
a4 sends to a1 propose(oc∨ bat)
a1 sends to a4 counter-example(hat+)
a4 sends to a1 propose(oc∨ at)
a1 sends to a4 acceptdirect
a4 sends to a2 propose(oc∨ at)
a2 sends to a4 acceptdirect
a4 sends to a3 propose(oc∨ at)
a3 sends to a4 acceptdirect
Property 3. MnC guarantees mutual MAS-consistency in any clique (fully connected society) of non-individualistic agents.
Proof. Let n2 = card(⋃i∈{2,...,n} O i \ O 1). Using the same principles as the ones used in demonstration of Property 1, we
show that each time a counter-example is sent (ﬁnally resulting in a acceptindirect) n2 decreases. As n2 is a positive integer,
it cannot decrease for ever. If n2 does not decrease, it means that the hypothesis is accepted directly by all agents, that is
h1 is consistent with all the observation sets of the system and all agents have this same hypothesis h1. Thus, all agents are
MAS-consistent, that is, the system is mutually MAS-consistent. This global revision mechanism hence guarantees mutual
MAS-consistency. 
Note however that this mechanism requires a1 to be able to communicate with all other agents. As a1 can be chosen
arbitrarily, this means that this mechanism can only guarantee this property in the context of fully connected societies
(cliques).
Clock-like Hypothesis Propagation without Adoption. Similarly to the case of local mechanisms, it is possible to deﬁne a
simple variant of this mechanism: the mechanism MnCwA obtained by using M2UwA (M2U without adoption) in MnC respects
the individualism of the agents, but can only ensure that the agent applying it is MAS-consistent. Thus, the learner agent
a1 applying this global revision mechanism will propose its hypothesis in turn to all other agents so that they can criticize
it. However, in this variant, when a critic agent accepts an hypothesis, it does not adopt it. Thus this variant only revises
the hypothesis of the learner agent to make it MAS-consistent. It guarantees MAS-consistency of the learner agent, but not
mutual MAS-consistency of the system.
Iterated Clock-like Hypothesis Propagation. We can make the ‘clock-like hypothesis propagation without adoption’ mecha-
nism MnCwA mutually MAS-consistent by making all agents whose hypothesis is inconsistent with o apply it in turn, starting
with the agent having received the observation o.4 We will denote the resulting global revision mechanism by MnC∗ . It
guarantees mutual MAS-consistency in any clique (fully connected society) of possibly individualistic agents.
4 Recall that the agents whose hypothesis is inconsistent with o will be the only ones that will need to change their hypothesis, since hypotheses
consistent with o will remain consistent with
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} O i ∪ {o} using the compositionality of the consistency relation.
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3.3. Global revision mechanisms (for connected societies)
Static sequential global protocol with propagation. When agents are topologically constrained in their communications,
a single learner cannot directly propose its hypothesis to all other agents, and the above-mentioned global mechanisms
cannot be used. Instead, the global mechanism must rely on some kind of propagation. To ensure that propagation does
not reach the same agent from two different ways, the ﬁrst basic idea is to eliminate cycles by constructing a spanning
tree (a tree-like sub-graph that contains all the nodes of the original communication graph). We describe here a mecha-
nism MnP to construct such a tree while propagating and reﬁning the hypothesis at the same time. The agent receiving a
new observation becomes the root of the tree. It begins the propagation by taking all of its neighbours as children, and then
selecting the ﬁrst one, ensuring mutual peer-consistency with it, and asking it to propagate this hypothesis. Fig. 3 illustrates
the sub-protocol MP (ai,k) triggered when an agent ai , who has already validated its hypothesis with its k ﬁrst conﬁrmed
children, receives the message propagate(k). The associated strategy is described below.
(1) If k = 0, and ai has some unchecked neighbours, it will ﬁrst send a request-link to each of its unchecked neighbours.
Each one of them can answer either accept-link (thus becoming a new child of ai), or reject-link if it is already part of
this tree. Either way the agents are marked out of the unchecked neighbours, and conﬁrmed sons are somehow ordered.
(2) If ai does not have more than k children (or, if k = 0, does not have any unchecked neighbour), it means it has no more
children to propagate its hypothesis to. It can then conﬁrm this hypothesis to its parent by sending it strong-accept. If
ai is the root of the tree, then the mechanism ends there.
(3) If ai has at least k + 1 children, it triggers a local revision mechanism M2U with this (k + 1)th child a′k .
• If M2U ends with a acceptindirect , it means that the hypothesis has been changed, and that ai now has at least one
counter-example for its previous hypothesis. As new hypotheses should only be proposed by the root of the tree, ai
sends hyp-changed to its parent (or itself if ai is the root).
• If M2U ends with a acceptdirect , ai is now in state 3. It sends propagate(0) to a′k , asking it to propagate in turn the
hypothesis to its own children, if any, starting with the ﬁrst one. a′k will then go through the same process as ai ,
ﬁnally ending with either strong-accept or hyp-changed.
◦ Receiving a hyp-changed, ai would be back in state 1 and initiate a local revision mechanism with the sender to get
some counter-example.
◦ Receiving a strong-accept, ai would then try to check its hypothesis with its next children, sending itself a
propagate(k + 1) to iterate the process. strong-accept or hyp-changed resulting from this would be directed to its
parent.
Note that in the case of a clique, MnP is equivalent to MnC .
Property 4. In a connected multiagent system of non-individualistic agents, the global revision mechanism MnP guarantees mutual
MAS-consistency.
Proof. (Sketch.) First, we consider the linking part of the protocol. The root links to each of its neighbours, and then, in time,
each of its children links to any neighbour that is not already linked in the tree. As a result we get a tree containing all
agents that are connected to the ﬁrst agent (the root). If the graph is connected, the whole system is in the resulting tree. If
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to MnC whose properties has been proven. So assume the depth of the tree is d > 1. Let n3 = card(
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} O j \ Or)
where ar is the root. Then we can consider each of the children of the root ar as a sub-tree containing this child and all its
descendants. When this child ac receives a propagate it applies the algorithm to a sub-tree of depth d − 1, ending with either
strong-accept or hyp-changed. An hyp-changed means that ac has changed its hypothesis hc = hr . As a parent never adopts an
hypothesis from a child, it means that ac has changed its hypothesis because of a counter-example o ∈⋃i∈{1,...,n} O j , which
is inconsistent with its old hypothesis hr . When ar engage a new conversation with protocol MU , this counter example
o will be added to Or and n3 will decrease. Thus only a ﬁnite number of hyp-changed messages will be send. When all
counter-examples are exhausted, each of the child of ar will ﬁnish their propagation by a strong-accept, and the protocol
will end with the hypothesis hr being common to all agents and consistent with every observation set of the system. 
Example 6. We give here an example of propagation with 4 agents. a1 is connected to a2 and a3, a2 is connected to a1, a3
and a4, a3 is connected to a1, a2 and a4, and a4 is connected to a2 and a3. The situation is the same as in the previous
example, namely: E1 = {hat+}, E2 = {boc+}, E3 = {rot−,bat+}, and E4 = ∅.
The previous deliberation has led the system to adopt the common hypothesis h = h1 = h2 = h3 = h4 = at ∨ boc.
Now, agent a4 receives a new example toc+, that is inconsistent with h. This triggers the global revision mechanism
MP as detailed below:
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The following table summarizes the different revision mechanisms presented here. The ﬁrst column is the mechanism
name, the second corresponds to the type of revision mechanism (either internal, local or global), the third is the consistency
property of the mechanism (with its domain) and the last column indicates if the mechanism respects the individualism of
the agents.
Mech. Type Consistency Indiv.
μEh internal internal consistency yes
M2U local mutual peer-consistency no
M2UwA local peer-consistency yes
M2B local mutual peer-consistency yes
MnC global mutual MAS-consistency (clique only) no
MnCwA global MAS-consistency (clique only) yes
MnC∗ global mutual MAS-consistency (clique only) yes
MnP global mutual MAS-consistent (connected societies) no
4. Applications
In the previous sections, we proposed a general framework and some speciﬁc revision mechanisms to deal with hypoth-
esis formation in a structured network of agents. This section now gives the details on the instantiation of this framework,
for two kinds of hypothesis formation: induction and abduction. Representation of observations, prior knowledge and hy-
potheses will be given for each of these cases, as well as an instantiation of the consistency relation for each of these
problem. Some details about hypothesis formation function or internal revision mechanism will complete the presentation.
4.1. Induction framework
We ﬁrst present how our general hypothesis reﬁnement problem ﬁts with inductive learning. This section thus shows
how to apply the mechanisms proposed above in the case of incremental MAS concept learning. It describes ﬁrst the
representation of the different pieces of knowledge needed for this problem, and how it relates to our formal model, before
deﬁning the consistency relation that we will use for this problem: Consind . Then a second subsection will give details about
the learning process, that is, the internal revision mechanism used by agents to build their hypotheses locally.
4.1.1. The learning task: representation and consistency
We consider a propositional language Lp , deﬁned over a set of atoms A. Negative literals are represented by additional
atoms, like not-a. The boolean formulae f = (a∧b)∨ (b∧¬c) will then be written (a∧b)∨ (b∧not− c). This representation
will be used for learning boolean formulae. A hypothesis will be a disjunction of terms called prototypes. Each prototype
is a conjunction of atoms a ∈ A. An observation here will be called an example. An example is represented by a tag +
or − and a description composed of a subset of atoms e ⊆ A. The observation set of an agent, called its example memory
E = E+ ∪ E− , consists of a set of positive examples E+ and a set of negative examples E− . In this setting, no explicit prior
common knowledge is used. We deﬁne the covering relation by the following: a prototype will be said to cover an example
(whether positive or negative) if its constituting atoms are included in the example, and a hypothesis will be said to cover
an example if one of its term covers it. Then, Consind(h, E), the instantiation of Consα for this inductive setting, states that
h is complete (meaning that it covers all positive examples of E+), and coherent (meaning that it does not cover any
negative example of E−). We will describe below the incremental learning process, which is internal revision mechanism
guaranteeing internal consistency, that we can use as the base internal revision mechanism for local revision mechanism
M2U or M2B .
4.1.2. Incremental learning process
The learning process is an update mechanism that, given a current hypothesis H , a memory E = E+ ∪ E− ﬁlled with
the previously received examples, and a new positive or negative example e, produces a new updated hypothesis. Before
this update, the given hypothesis is consistent. After the update, the new hypothesis must be complete and coherent with
the new memory state E ∪ {e}. We describe below our single agent update mechanism, inspired by previous work on
incremental learning [8].
In the following, a hypothesis H for the target formula f is a list of terms h, each of them being a conjunction of atoms.
H is coherent if all terms h are coherent, and H is complete if each element of E+ is covered by at least one term h of H .
Each term is by construction the lgg (least general generalisation) of a subset of positives instances {e1, . . . , en} [6], that is
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lgg(e) the most speciﬁc term that covers e, and as lgg(h, e) the most speciﬁc term which is more general than h and that
covers e. Restricting the term to lgg is the basis of a lot of Bottom-Up learning algorithms (for instance [6]). In the typology
proposed by Maloof and Michalski [10], our update mechanism is an incremental learner with full instance memory: learning
is made by successive updates and all examples are stored. Note that this is also a case of learning from interpretations [4].
The update mechanism depends on the ongoing hypothesis H , the ongoing examples E+ and E− , and the new example e.
There are three possible cases:
• e is positive and H covers e, or e is negative and H does not cover e. No update is needed, H is already complete and
coherent with E ∪ {e}.
• e is positive and H does not cover e: e is denoted as a positive counterexample of H . Then we seek to generalise in turn
the terms h of H . If a correct generalisation can be found, the ﬁrst generalisation h′ = lgg(h, e) to be found replaces h
in H and any term that is less general that h′ is discarded from the hypothesis. If no generalisation is correct (meaning
here coherent), H ∪ lgg(e) replaces H .
• e is negative and H covers e: e is denoted as a negative counterexample of H . Each term h covering e is then discarded
from H and replaced by a set of terms {h′1, . . . ,h′n} that is, as a whole, coherent with E− ∪ {e} and that covers the
examples of E+ uncovered by H − {h}. Terms of the ﬁnal hypothesis H that are less general than others are discarded
from H .
Example 7. We will once more use the cards problem to illustrate the learning process by giving several consecutive ap-
plications of the mechanism. Agent a0 uses the revision mechanism μ(E,h, e) that was just described. Its hypothesis h is
initially equals to false (empty disjunction). This hypothesis thus initially classiﬁes every card as negative (second pile).
(i) Agent a0 then gets example bat+. The revision mechanism thus modiﬁes its hypothesis and example memory so that
we now have: h = bat and E = {bat+}.
(ii) Next example is hat+. It is once more a positive counter-example. Using the revision mechanism, a0 attempts to
generalise the ﬁrst term by lgg(hat,bat) = at. This generalisation is correct since it does not cover any negative example.
New hypothesis is now h = at, and E = {bat+,hat+}.
(iii) Then, we receive sec−. It is a negative example that does not contradict the hypothesis. No update is done to the
hypothesis and the example is just memorized. Thus h = at, and E = {bat+,hat+, sec−}.
(iv) Fourth example is boc+, which is a new positive counter example. Generalisation with the ﬁrst term is not correct.
This example is thus added as a new prototype in the hypothesis. Thus h = at ∨ boc, and E = {bat+,hat+,boc+, sec−}.
(v) Next example is toc+, still another positive counter-example. Generalisation with ﬁrst term gives lgg(at, toc) = t ,
which does not cover any negative example. Thus h = t ∨ boc, and E = {bat+,hat+,boc+, toc+, sec−}.
(vi) Finally, we receive rot−, which is a negative counter-example. Indeed, rot is covered by t . The term t is thus dis-
carded from the hypothesis, and we attempt to specialise it with atoms from A \ {r,o}. t was covering bat, hat and toc
which are not covered by the second term boc. The best specialisation of t is at which covers bat and hat. hat and bat
are discarded from the list of examples that should be covered and we note that we should cover lgg(hat,bat) = at. Then,
there is only one uncovered example left, toc, so we just note that toc should be covered. At this step, h = boc and we must
cover at and toc. First, we try to cover at. Generalisation with boc is not correct, so we just add at to the hypothesis. Thus
h = boc ∨ at. Then, we still have to cover toc. Generalisation with boc gives lgg(boc, toc) = oc which is correct. Thus, after
this revision process, we have: h = oc∨ at, and E = {bat+,hat+,boc+, toc+, sec−, rot−}.
This hypothesis is equal to the chosen criterion, so any card drawn thereafter will be consistent with it and will not
trigger any revision.
Property 5. An agent using this internal revisionmechanism is locally eﬃcient, that is, it can always ﬁnd a hypothesis that is consistent
with its example memory.
Proof. If a new example is consistent with the hypothesis, the returned unmodiﬁed hypothesis is consistent with the whole
set of examples using compositionality of the consistency relation. If a new example is a positive counter-example, then
either a correct generalisation is found, or it is added as a prototype to the hypothesis. In the ﬁrst case, the new hypothesis
is coherent (since the new generalisation does not cover any negative example and no negative example was covered by the
other terms of the hypothesis) and complete (since the positive examples previously covered are still covered and the new
positive example is by deﬁnition covered by the new hypothesis). In the second case, the new hypothesis is complete (since
previously covered examples are still covered and the new positive is covered), and coherent, since the only new example
that is covered is the new positive example, and world consistency (Assumption 1) implies that an example cannot be
both positive and negative. Thus the new hypothesis can be built and is consistent. Finally, if the new example is a negative
counter-example, all terms in the hypothesis that it covers are replaced by coherent and complete list of prototypes covering
all positive examples uncovered by the suppression of the term. This list of prototypes always exists: in the worst case, it
can be the list of positive examples uncovered by the suppression of term, which will ensure completeness by deﬁnition
and be coherent since consistent world assumption does not allow an example to be both positive and negative. Therefore
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ensures internal consistency. Thus the agent is indeed locally eﬃcient. 
Note that this mechanism tends to both make a minimal update of the current hypothesis and minimise the number of
terms in the hypothesis, in particular by discarding terms less general than other ones after updating a hypothesis.
4.2. Abduction framework
As a second instantiation of our framework, we propose to deal with abductive hypotheses in a ﬁnite ﬁrst-order logic
setting. We shall ﬁrst present the formal instantiation, with the representation of observations, prior knowledge and hy-
potheses, before deﬁning the consistency for logical abduction, Consabd , as well as the hypothesis formation function that
we used in this setting. In a second part, we give a detailed example, using this representation for a simpliﬁed medical
diagnosis problem. This second part thus illustrates how the logical abduction framework can be ﬁtted to some speciﬁc
application.
4.2.1. Formal machinery
We present here the adaptation of our formal model to an abductive framework, drawing inspiration from Poole’s Theo-
rist system. We consider a ﬁrst-order language L1. O stands for the predeﬁned set of possible observations that can possibly
be made in any instance of the described system. (In representing this set, we shall use non-ground schemes where any
term with a capital letter denotes a variable, and all variables are universally quantiﬁed. It then represents all its ground
instances in a given Herbrand universe.) Each agent ai is modeled as a slightly modiﬁed version of an instance of a Theorist
system [12]:
〈F ,H,, O i,Θi,hi〉
where
• F a set of facts, closed formulae taken as being true in the domain;
• H a set of abducible predicates which act as conjectures, possible hypotheses common to all agents;
•  is the preference relation, a (complete) pre-order on the hypotheses that we assume common to all agents.
• O i ⊆ O is a set of grounded formulae representing the observations made so far by the agent. Each agent knows every
observation in this set to be true, as its sensors are considered perfect;
• Θi is the set of selected hypotheses, which will be deﬁned below;
• hi is the favourite hypothesis of the agent, that it assumes to be true, and that serves as a basis for deriving its belief set.
F ,H, are common to all agents. F represents prior knowledge of the agent on the environment and its rules. We ﬁrst
recall a number of basic deﬁnitions, used for deﬁning Θi , from which hi is taken.
Deﬁnition 6 (Scenario [12]). A scenario of (F ,H) is a set θ of ground instances of elements of H such that θ ∪F is consistent
(that is θ ∪ F |).
Deﬁnition 7 (Explanation of a closed formulae [12]). If g is a closed formula, then an explanation of g from (F ,H) is a scenario
θ of (F ,H) that (with F ) implies g (that is θ ∪ F | g).
We now introduce a couple of further notions that are useful in our context. Events occurring in the world and observed
by the agents may or may not be explained, or contradicted, by the agent model.
Deﬁnition 8 (Positive/Negative observations). A positive (resp. negative) observation of (F ,H) is an observation o ∈ O such
that there exists an explanation of o (resp. ¬o) from (F ,H).
In the following, we shall write P (O ) to refer to the set of all positive observations of (F ,H) in O ⊆ O, and N(O )
to refer to the set of all negative observations of (F ,H) in O ⊆ O. Note that this is not necessarily a partition: some
observations may have no explanation, while some others may be explained and have at the same time their negation
explained. Moreover, if o ∈ O and ¬o ∈ O, then o is positive iff ¬o is negative.
Deﬁnition 9 (Explanation of an observation set). If O ⊆ O is a set of observations, an explanation of O from (F ,H) is an
explanation θ of P (O ) from (F ,H) such that θ ∪ F ∪ N(O ) is consistent (which implies the consistency of θ ∪ O ). That is:
θ ∪ F | P (O ) and θ ∪ F ∪ N(O ) |.
In the following, we shall also refer to the conjunction h of the elements of θ as the hypothesis associated to this
explanation. Typically, as suggested by the aforementioned model, different explanations will exist for a given formula.
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explanations. In our framework, we shall use classical notions [12]. We shall ﬁrst require the explanations to be irreducible,
then apply on top of that a preference criterion to discriminate remaining candidate explanations (e.g. based on the least
presumptive principle, or on cardinal minimality).
Deﬁnition 10 (Irreducible explanation). An irreducible explanation of O from (F ,H) is an explanation such that if any
element of its associated hypothesis set θ is removed from it, it is no longer an explanation of O . In other words, an
irreducible explanation is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion.
We can now give the precise deﬁnition of Θi and hi :
• Θi , the set of selected hypotheses associated with each irreducible explanations of the observation set O i .
Θi =
{∧
p∈θ
p | θ is an irreducible explanation of O i from (F ,H)
}
.
For a given set of observation O i , EΘ , the explanation function returns the set of all hypotheses associated with an
irreducible explanation of O i from (F ,H).
• hi is the favourite hypothesis used as a working hypothesis. It is an element of Θi chosen by the agent among minimal
hypothesis according to the preference relation p , that is hi ∈minp (Θi). We can then abstract away all these elements
in the hypothesis formation function: Eh associates any set of observation O i with an hypothesis hi ∈minp (EΘ(O i)).
The instantiation of the consistency relation for this abductive setting (denoted Consabd(h, O )) is then deﬁned as the
combination of two properties:
• coherence, that is ∀o ∈ N(O ), {h} ∪ F | ¬o (which implies ∀o ∈ O , {h} ∪ F | ¬o)
• completeness, that is ∀o ∈ P (O ), {h} ∪ F | o.
Note that this deﬁnition of consistency corresponds to the logical deﬁnition of abductive explanation. We have: Consabd(h, O )
iff h is an abductive explanation of O for the theory F . Our deﬁnition of Eh ensures these properties, and so enables each
agent to guarantee its internal consistency.
Property 6. If there exists at least one scenario θ0 such that all facts and possible positive observations in the system belong to the
theory T = Cn(F ∪ θ0) (F ⊂ T and ∀O i, P (O i) ⊂ T ), and that the theory T is consistent with any possible negative observation,
an agent using this internal revision mechanism is locally eﬃcient (that is, it can always ﬁnd a hypothesis that is consistent with its
example memory).
Proof. Let O i be an observation set. Then P (O i) ⊂ T gives F ∪ θ0 | P (O i). Moreover T being consistent with any possible
negative observation implies that F ∪θ0 ∪N(O i) is consistent. Then h0 =∧p∈θ0 p ∈ EΘ(O i). Thus Θi = EΘ(O i) is not empty
and there exists hi ∈minp (Θi). By deﬁnition, hi is consistent with O i . 
Note that the consistent world assumption ensures that such a scenario exists if H is not too restrictive and F complete
enough. Indeed, this assumption ensures that there exists a consistent theory T 0 such that F ⊂ T 0 and ∀i, O i ⊂ T 0. If H
is deﬁned in such a way that T 0 \ F can be expressed with ground instances of H, then the condition for local eﬃciency
is veriﬁed.
Example 8. We consider several agents trying to diagnose together which disease affects some person. They share the same
medical knowledge F about diseases and symptoms, but each of the agent has only observed some incomplete part of the
symptoms affecting the person. Observations would be the observable symptoms (effects or manifestations of the diseases),
abducible predicates correspond to diseases (causes of the symptoms), and the facts are the rules linking diseases and
symptoms. Hypotheses could then be conjunctions of abducible ground facts. In this context, our preference relation selects
explanations with minimal cardinality (as it seems more likely that someone has one disease rather that several).
O = {Fever(X),Cough(X),Mucus(X),ThroatAche(X), SwallowsEasily(X),
¬Fever(X),¬Cough(X),¬Mucus(X),¬ThroatAche(X),¬SwallowsEasily(X)}
H = {Flu(X),Bronchitis(X),Angina(X),HayFever(X)}
F = {Flu(X) ⇒ Fever(X), Flu(X) ⇒ Cough(X),
Bronchitis(X) ⇒ Cough(X),Bronchitis(X) ⇒Mucus(X),Bronchitis(X) ⇒ ThroatAche(X),
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HayFever(X) ⇒Mucus(X)}
Note that Fever(X),Cough(X),Mucus(X) and ThroatAche(X) and also ¬SwallowsEasily(X) are positive observation schemes,
whereas on the other hand SwallowsEasily(X), ¬Fever(X), ¬Cough(X), ¬Mucus(X), and ﬁnally ¬ThroatAche(X) are negative
observation schemes.
Now suppose that agent a1 has observed
O 1 =
{
Fever(Tom),¬ThroatAche(Tom)}
From these observations, it can deduce two explanations: θu = {Flu(Tom)} and θuh = {Flu(Tom),HayFever(Tom)}. But θuh is
not irreducible (as θu ⊂ θuh is also an explanation). Therefore, Θ1 = {Flu(Tom)} and h1 = Flu(Tom). Suppose in addition that
agent a2 has observed
O 2 =
{
Cough(Tom),Mucus(Tom)
}
From these observations, it gets two explanations: θb = {Bronchitis(Tom)} and θuh = {Flu(Tom),HayFever(Tom)}, as well
as other redundant explanations such as {Flu(Tom),HayFever(Tom),Angina(Tom)}, etc. Therefore, Θ2 = {Bronchitis(Tom),
Flu(Tom) ∧ HayFever(Tom)}. By virtue of the minimality principle, it then selects h2 = Bronchitis(Tom). Now if these two
agents were to communicate using the Bilateral Hypothesis Exchange Protocol, we would get the following dialogue.
a1 sends to a2 propose(Flu(Tom))
a2 sends to a1 counter-example(Mucus(Tom))
a1 sends to a2 propose(Flu(Tom) ∧ HayFever(Tom))
a2 sends to a1 counter-propose(Bronchitis(Tom))
a1 sends to a2 counter-example(¬ThroatAche(Tom))
a2 sends to a1 propose(Flu(Tom) ∧ HayFever(Tom))
a1 sends to a2 accept
5. Related work
This paper extends our previous work by setting up an abstract framework for hypothesis reﬁnement under communica-
tion constraints, that can be instantiated with abductive or inductive reasoning agents. More speciﬁcally, Bourgne et al. [2]
were concerned with a speciﬁc dynamic abductive application where different types of mechanisms were explored, while
Bourgne et al. [3] mainly investigated one speciﬁc mechanism in the context of distributed learning. This paper abstracts
away from these applications and proposes a detailed catalogue of generic mechanisms for hypothesis reﬁnement. When
we consider the speciﬁc contexts of abductive or inductive reasoning, some interesting links can be made with other works.
The problem of multiagent diagnosis has been studied by Roos et al. [13], where a number of distributed entities try
to come up with a satisfying global diagnosis of the whole system. They show in particular that the number of messages
required to establish this global diagnosis is bound to be prohibitive, unless the communication is enhanced with some
suitable protocol. This approach, however, does not consider any speciﬁc constraint governing the agents’ interactions. One
other piece of work connected to the trend of agent-oriented computational logic that is particularly relevant to our ap-
proach is that of Gavanelli et al. [7]. They identify under which circumstances some notion of global or local consistency (the
counterparts of our mutual MAS and internal consistency) can be achieved. However, they abstract away from any speciﬁc
protocol in their study, concentrating on the deﬁnition of what it semantically means for a group to reason abductively.
There is also a growing body of work related to distributed learning, although mostly concerned with non-symbolic
approaches. Still, some works share some of our assumptions: Wang and Gasser [14] for instance, address the problem
of “mutual online concept learning” in a multiagent context, and regard agents as both learner and teacher, but they do
not provide any counterexamples, whereas our critic agent does. In more general terms, an interesting connection can
be made to Angluin’s different type of queries [1]: equivalence queries correspond to proposals, and although membership
queries have not direct counterparts in our approach, it is easy to imagine that an agent could simply ask whether some
observations have been made by another agent. A major difference though lies in the fact that these requests are addressed
to an oracle. More closely related to our approach is the work of Ontañón and Plaza [11]: they use, as we do, expressive
communication patterns to allow the exchange of different arguments. Their results provide some further justiﬁcation for
the use of such techniques, in the slightly different context of case-based reasoning (and without any topological constraints
on communications).
6. Discussion and concluding remarks
The main objective of this paper has been to set up the foundations of a framework for investigating the properties of
different protocols for hypothesis reﬁnement. In particular, we advocate the use of expressive means of interaction whereby
agents can provide justiﬁcations as to why they accept or reject some given hypothesis. We have investigated how (under
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a clique of agents; and (iii) in general in a society of agents. In particular, we have shown how this approach can be
instantiated in the context of abductive or inductive tasks. To make this statement more precise, we report in the following
table the correspondence between our formal model and the inductive and abductive framework used here.
Formal Model Abductive/Inductive framework
Supporting language abd.: ﬁrst-order logic (L1)
ind: propositional (LP ) over a set of atoms A
Possible hypotheses H abd.: set of abducible predicates H
ind: any prototype p (conjunction of atoms)
Belief base (Ai ) abd.: favourite explanation of O i from (F ,H)
ind: set of prototype {p1, . . . , pm}
Working hypothesis (hi ) abd.: conjunction of grounded abducibles predicates of Ai (hi )
ind: disjunction of prototype in Ai (hi )
Observations (O) abd.: set of possible observations, grounded formulae (O)
ind: Examples: label+ description (set of atoms)
Observation set (O i ) abd.: observation set O i , contains P (O i) and N(O i)
ind: Example memory Ei = E+i ∪ E−i
Prior common knowledge (F) abd.: set of facts (F)
ind: none
Consistency relation (Consα(h, O )) abd.: compl. for P (O ), coherence with N(O ) (Consabd(h, O ))
ind: completeness and coherence (Consind(h, E))
Internal revision mechanism (μ or Eh) abd.: Theorist based hyp. formation func. (h′ = Eh(O ))
ind: inc. bottom-up learning process (h′ = μ(E,h, e))
Now the concrete assessment of these protocols is very much dependent on the actual domain where they are even-
tually implemented. In a ﬁrst companion paper [3], those aspects have been experimentally investigated in the context of
incremental inductive supervised concept learning. Especially the effectiveness in term of accuracy and eﬃciency in term
of redundancy were evaluated for protocol MnC . In a second companion paper [2], the eﬃciency and effectiveness of such
protocols have been studied in the very different context of a critical situation (hence involving a dynamic communication
network) involving a number of agents aiming at escaping from a burning building. In this abductive application, agents ob-
serve the evolving environment and communicate observations and hypotheses. The results reported in these papers indeed
emphasize the importance of the application domain for protocol design. We observed for instance in this last application
that the eﬃciency of hypothesis exchange (as opposed to a mere observation exchange) depends very much on the type of
map representing the building.
The distributed perspective advocated in this paper is not original per se. It is well known that such an approach improves
the robustness of the process (by not relying on a single central agent), and that it is well adapted to situations where many
agents are used to fetch and report observations (typically distributed sensor networks). But the approach advocated in this
paper goes further than these expected results. In particular, different experiments (see [3]) on our learning framework show
a clear improvement in terms of effectiveness, when compared to similar centralized techniques. In fact, it is even possible
to see the distributed approach using the clock-like hypothesis propagation mechanism MnC with n agents as a (centralized)
learning method equipped with n memory sets (not necessarily parallel). The same experiments exhibit a clear accuracy
gain over a single agent using an incremental internal mechanism. Our conjecture to explain this is that relying on agents’
autonomy to seek local consistency leads to a better exploration of the hypothesis space, due to the fact that each agent can
make its own exploration of the space from different samples of examples (though adoption give the same starting point).
More precisely, the incremental aspect of the learning algorithm makes it dependent on the order of example occurrence.
The above results suggest that our mechanisms provide simple heuristics to ﬁnd such good sequences of examples, each
agent locally ‘ﬁltering’ these examples it perceives or get to know from a partner agent. This was not necessarily expected
beforehand, but seems to be conﬁrmed by further experiments showing better accuracy gains on hard boolean problems
than on ML-databases (see [3]).
A challenging research question that follows is to see how this incremental approach could be used for abduction as
well. Clearly, even if this side-effect in terms of accuracy is not observed, there are good chances that the eﬃciency will be
much improved, by avoiding to recompute the hypothesis from scratch at each step.
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